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Asia has emerged as the balancing wheel of global finance. The countries of Asia now 
account for 70 per cent of global foreign exchange reserves, compared to only 30 per 
cent in 1990 and 21 per cent in the early 1970s. This paper explores theoretical 
interpretations for the relatively high demand for international reserves by 
developing countries especially in the Far East. This paper provides calculations of the 
minimal necessary level of international reserves based on benchmarks proposed by 
Wijnholds and Kapteyn, as well as a discussion of costs of reserves’ holding. It 
therefore provides empirical proof that exchange reserve levels for many of the 
developing countries have far exceeded the desirable levels. Paper then discusses the 




Foreign exchange reserves of most emerging economies of the world have grown 
many times over during the last few years. Many of the East Asian countries had 
small reserves following the 1997 financial debacle arising out of the sudden flight of 
foreign capital from there. For example, South Korea, had only $4 billion by the end 
of 1997, but has now $138 billion. Similar is the case with many other South East 
Asian emerging economies. Countries have been accumulating reserves well beyond 
levels that would be deemed adequate by the simple import-based yardstick. In what 
became known as the “Mrs. Machlup’s Wardrobe Theory of International Reserves”, 
Mrs. Machlup suggested that the acquisitive characteristics of monetary authorities in 
terms of adding to their reserves resembled those of his wife in terms of clothes. He 
argued that monetary authorities essentially looked to maximize their reserves. As 
such, the demand for reserves in any period could, according to Mr. Malchup, be 
characterized simply as being equal to the level of reserves in the previous period plus 
some growth factor no matter what the level of imports or any other underlying 
economic variable. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes recent trends in 
reserve holdings by developing countries and demonstrates that the emerging markets 
of the Far East are outliers in terms of their sizeable reserve holdings. It also discusses 
some theories that enhance our understanding of why emerging markets may want to 
hold large precautionary reserve balances in the aftermath of financial crisis of ’97-
’98. Section 3 discusses empirical means of computing an adequate level of reserve for 
developing countries and shows that most of the developing countries are well past 
the optimal level. In Section 4 we explore the costs associated with supporting a large 
reserve level and what can central banks do in order to ride over this crisis of excess. 
Section 5 presents some concluding thoughts. 
 
Factors leading to Reserve Accumulations 
 
Broadly speaking the economic factors that influence forex reserve build up can be 
summarized as the following: 
• Economic size. To the extent that international transactions increase with economic 
size, reserves are expected to rise with population and real GDP per capita. 
• Current account vulnerability. A more open economy is more vulnerable to external 
shocks, so greater trade openness would be associated with higher reserve holdings. 
Also, larger the external shocks (say export volatility), higher the level of reserves. 
•  Capital account vulnerability. As with the current account, greater financial 
openness could be associated with higher crisis vulnerability and thus influence the demand for reserves. In addition, greater the potential for resident based capital flight 
from the domestic currency, higher is the level of reserves. 
•  Exchange rate flexibility. Greater flexibility reduces the demand for reserves, 
because central banks no longer need a large stockpile of reserves to manage a pegged 
exchange rate. However, many countries that have adopted more flexible exchange 
rate regimes (including managed floats) appear reluctant to allow much actual 
variability. Consequently, it is important to focus on the actual behavior of exchange 
rates, which suggests that there has in fact been some increase in exchange rate 
flexibility in recent years, especially in several emerging Asian economies 
• Opportunity cost. The opportunity cost of holding reserves is the difference between 
the yield on reserves and the marginal productivity of an alternative investment. The 
greater the opportunity cost, the lower the level of reserves. With industrial country 
interest rates hitting 40–50 year lows in many countries, the cost of holding foreign 
exchange reserves has likely increased for many emerging economies over the past 
three years. 
 
Ken Rogoff, former chief economist at IMF, had said: "It is one thing to save for a 
rainy day, but one trillion dollars in reserve accumulation is more like building 
Noah's Ark." Asian Countries stung by the experience of the Asian Crisis in ‘97-98 
and the resulting heightened awareness of their vulnerability, decided to provide 
themselves substantial cushion against any future eventuality. In case of countries 
which have large overseas working population like India, Pakistan, Philippines, 
homeward remittances have increased steeply after 9/11. Moreover the world 
economy is on a revival track and this has led to huge export earnings for a majority 
of emerging economies, adding to the forex reserves. An upward movement in the 
stock markets in major emerging economies has also contributed by increasing the 
capital inflows from FIIs. Another factor leading to the high reserves is China’s low-
wage competitiveness which seriously threatens the export prospects of many Asian 
nations, including India. Estimates of the extent of under-valuation of Chinese 
renminbi range from 25% to 50%. Under such a scenario, it becomes crucial for the 
central banks to prevent appreciation of the domestic currencies in order to prevent 
or delay erosion of their export competitiveness. Thus market intervention in form of 
purchase of US dollars further leads to reserve accumulation among these countries. 
In case of India, NRIs, with a view to taking advantage of the interest rate differential 
between the dollar and the rupee, are increasing their remittances in India. US 
deposit rates are at 1.5%, while Indian deposit rates are at around 6.0%. This provides 
a differential of 4.5%. Factoring in an expected depreciation of 2% in the rupee versus 
the dollar during the year, NRI deposits still earn a healthy 2.5% compared with what 
they get in the US markets. Also, foreign investors are putting more money into India 
as they seek to profit from its relatively high bond yields. Indian bonds have always 
offered attractive yields compared to more developed countries, but exchange rate losses caused by a depreciating rupee in the past had discouraged foreign funds. Now, 
since the rupee is appreciating against the dollar, foreign investors are finding it 
attractive to increase their investments in India. 
 
Identifying an optimal Reserve Level 
 
Literature on international reserves provides several criteria of their adequacy, 
including comparisons of reserves with monetary aggregates, imports, and debt. 
Almost all of them apart from ratio of reserves to short term debt have been 
marginalized for use in specific cases. The imports criterion (ratio of reserves to 
imports) is especially important for countries with rather limited access to 
international financial resources. For instance, Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001) propose 
to apply import-based measure of reserves adequacy to low-income developing 
countries, where involvement into international capital flows is fairly low. The ratio 
of reserves to monetary aggregates can be useful as an indicator of the potential 
impact of capital flight, especially in countries with weak banking systems, but needs 
to be supplemented with an analysis of other possible sources of capital flight 
(including short-term government liabilities). 
 
One of the most debated issue regarding the import-based reserves adequacy criteria 
is the benchmark. The rule of thumb, frequently used by the IMF, is three months of 
imports. There are other possible benchmarks proposed by various researchers like 
establishing at least 35 percent reserves/import coverage (i.e. 4.2 months of imports). 
A study conducted by IMF way back in 1958 supported a 30% to 50% 
reserves/imports ratio, or 4 – 6 months of imports. 
 
In the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, the extent of short-term indebtedness has 
been found to be a key indicator of illiquidity and a robust predictor of financial 
crisis. Consequently, the reserves-to-short-term external debt ratio has gradually 
become accepted as an indicator of the threshold at which investors lose confidence, 
linking the measure to the theory of currency crisis. Pablo Guidotti, former Deputy 
Minister of Finance of Argentina, is credited with being the first to propose that 
countries should manage their external assets and liabilities in such a way as to be 
capable of living without foreign borrowing for up to one year. This “external balance 
sheet rule” or Guidotti rule implies that the usable foreign exchange reserves should 
exceed scheduled amortizations of foreign currency debts in the following year as also 
such of the liabilities, as could be foreseen. 
 
In 2001, Wijnholds and Kapteyn proposed a new criterion of international reserves’ 
adequacy for emerging countries that could be considered as an extension of money-based and debt-based criteria, hereinafter referred as WK criterion. It consists of foll. 
three components: short-term debt by remaining maturity, fraction of M2 considered 
as an indicator of potential for capital flight in the country and capital flight 
probability indicator. It aims to capture two important risk factors, namely an 
“external drain” (as measured by debt based measures) and “internal drain”, or capital 
flight by residents. 
 
  Table 1 provides computation of the ‘Adequate Reserve Level’ for a number of 
developing countries and compares it with the actual reserves. For countries with a 
managed float or fixed regime the fraction of M2 was taken between 10 and 20 
percent whereas for floating exchange rate regime and currency, share was taken to 
be between 5 and 10 percent. To measure capital flight probability indicator, we made 
use of Economist’s country risk index which takes into account 77 different indicators 
ranging from monetary and fiscal policy to political stability. 
 
Results obtained extend credence to the belief that majority of the countries have 
grossly inflated reserve levels. India for instance needs around $17B - $25B of foreign 
exchange reserves whereas it had approximately $82B in reserves as of July 2003.  
 
Besides, W-C criterion, several other models for arriving at an optimal level of 
reserves has been discussed in research papers. For instance, Frenkel-Jovanovic derive 
the optimal reserve holdings to be as follows: 
 
R0 = (cs/r0.5)1/2 (1) 
 
Where R0 = desired reserves, c = country-specific nominal constant; s = standard 
deviation of reserve movements; and r = opportunity cost of holding reserves. It  
reveals desired reserve holdings to be a positive function of volatility and a negative 
function of the opportunity costs of maintaining reserves. 
 
Aizenman and Marion (2003) have recently estimated the following generalized 
reserve equation using a panel of 122 developing countries over the period 1980-96: 
 
ln(Rit/Pit) = a0 +a1ln(popit)+ a2ln(gpcit)+ a3ln(exait) + a4ln(imyit) + a5ln(neerit) + et 
(2) 
 
where: R is actual holdings of reserves minus gold (millions of US dollars deflated by 
the US GDP deflator, P); pop is the total population of the country; gpc is real GDP 
per capita; exa is the volatility of real export receipts; imy is the share of imports of 
goods and services in GDP; and neer  is the volatility of the nominal effective 
exchange rate. Results obtained using W-K Criterion can be verified using these other approaches 
and current values for the different variable but that work has been left for future 
study. 
 
Opportunity Cost of maintaining high Reserve levels 
 
The practice of accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, which is the main part of 
the Asian exchange rate management, is not costless. While adequate foreign 
exchange reserves are needed, they do come at a cost. Reserves held in U.S. 
Treasuries, for example, earn a modest return, far below these countries' own cost of 
borrowing either in local currency or in dollars. Yield on reserves is much lower than 
the potential return they could earn by using those reserves to make real investments 
in the economy, such as building roads, bridges, and schools. The World Bank, in its 
latest report, Global Development Finance, 2003, has said that foreign exchange 
reserves in most developing countries have gone up much above the widely used 
benchmarks and carry a significant carrying cost. The report says that $ 110 billion 
was added to the official reserves of developing countries in 2002, the highest-ever in 
recent years. Interestingly, India alone added $ 21 billion to its reserves during the 
year. High external reserve holdings come with a significant carrying cost in terms of 
interest rates. Most countries invest their foreign exchange reserves in relatively safe, 
short-term assets, such as US treasury bills. The yield on a 10-year US treasury bill is 
at 4.16% - well below the interest rates that developing countries pay on their 
external debt.  
The rate of return on the investments of foreign exchange reserves is much lower 
than what the economies can obtain by investing their resources in their own 
industries and infrastructure. This quasi-fiscal cost of managing large foreign 
exchange reserves is, indeed, too high for the Asian economies.  
Ideally, the opportunity cost should be measured as the difference between the 
highest possible marginal productivity forgone from an alternative investment in 
fixed assets and the yield on international reserves. However, it is not possible to 
obtain such a measure for a large sample of developing countries. A less satisfactory 
but standard way of computing the opportunity cost is by taking  differential between 
the country’s own-interest rate and the interest rate on U.S. Treasuries, and 
multiplying it by the excess reserve level. Table 2 provides this data where Excess 
reserve has bee taken as the difference between Actual reserves and level of reserves 
computed using W-K criterion. For India, annual opportunity cost of maintaining 
excess reserves comes out to be around .7% of GDP. 
 Management of excess Reserves 
It’s well known that the most immediate aspect of crisis response, and its successful 
management, is access to short-term hard currency to ward off the liquidity scarcity 
that follows as investors panic and flee the domestic capital market. . Underlying this 
reserve accumulation strategy is the assumption that when a crisis occurs, access to 
the private international capital market is uncertain and an International Monetary 
Fund bailout may also not be immediately forthcoming. Further, the IMF bailout is a 
subset of the prevailing international political economy, which may or may not be to 
a national government’s advantage. The crisis-bitten, wiser-by-experience East Asian 
economies have examined and are trying to find a solution through creating a 
regional network of bilateral currency swaps and repurchase agreements. Recall the 
post-Bretton Woods period when the industrialized countries established a network 
of bilateral swap arrangements amongst themselves as a source of liquidity to sustain 
their exchange rate pegs. The East Asian initiative, called the Chiang-Mai initiative, is 
a regional set-up that intends to be an immediate and unconditional credit line to its 
members in the event of a crisis, though finer contours are still being thrashed out. 
Being a regional arrangement (Asean countries and China, Korea and Japan), it 
represents an Asian perspective that not only corresponds to the observed regional 
nature of crisis contagion but a broadly common placement in the international 
political economy. . A desirable difference between this arrangement and the IMF 
credit facility is that a mutual currency swap can be reversed after the storm has 
passed. In 1999 the IMF has also introduced a new instrument, namely Contingent 
Credit Lines, to protect countries from contagion effect providing extra liquidity 
(Bussiere and Mulder, 1999). This instrument may enhance the access to international 
funding in the future. 
Conclusion 
The emerging economies can use there excess reserves to spur growth and 
productivity in their countries. These economies can facilitate the import of 
technology and Capital Goods and thus scale up productivity using these reserves. 
The release of foreign exchange for purchase of foreign goods and services like travel, 
medical needs, educations etc by domestic residents can be liberalized.  Allowing 
domestic companies to acquire foreign corporations and removal of caps on foreign 
payments like royalty, technology transfer fees etc. will also ease the pressure of 
excess reserves at the same time increasing productivity of the economy. The excess 
reserves should also be used to prepay foreign debts so as to reduce the debt servicing 
obligation on the economy.  
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minimum maximum minimum maximum
Brazil 49,251 527 36,662 184.932 9.2465874 18.493175 52 41.470225 46.278451 47488 2.8497
Chile 17,306 21527 11,233 33.989 1.6994553 3.3989106 23 11.623875 12.014749 15406.3 633.35
Colombia 12,994 66232 4,021 23.003 1.1501407 2.3002813 53 4.6305745 5.2401491 10338 2879.3
India 64,100 18091 9,245 399.360 19.967991 39.935982 41 17.431876 25.618753 81920 45.3
Indonesia 37,384 933676 14,904 109.818 5.4909198 10.98184 62 18.30837 21.712741 32990 8,502.00
Korea 170,303 591552 47,288 502.307 25.115355 50.23071 27 54.069146 60.850292 132831 1,177.67
Mexico 175,684 1394 31,674 126.075 6.303756 12.607512 47 34.636765 37.599531 54135 11.0569
Peru 8,161 0.071 6,648 0.020 0.0010222 0.0020444 52 6.6485315 6.6490631 9665.1 3.4729
Philippines 38,222 2299 8,762 41.554 2.0777225 4.1554451 52 9.8424157 10.922831 12984 55.325
Poland 50,936 336 13,260 83.253 4.1626403 8.3252806 39 14.88343 16.506859 30849.1 4.0359
Russian 
Federation 74,839 3631 19,655 121.114 6.0557038 12.111408 51 22.743409 25.831818 60709.9 29.98
South 
Africa 28,748 722 10,894 104.408 5.2203841 10.440768 44 13.190969 15.487938 6430 6.9152




China 383,410 22765 38,071 2750.526 275.05256 550.10512 42 153.59307 269.11515 361340 8.2766
Czech 
Republic 47,645 1781 5,643 64.644 6.4643986 12.928797 35 7.9055395 10.168079 25032 27.5509
Hungary 45,281 8894 11,365 40.295 4.0295397 8.0590794 37 12.85593 14.346859 12181 220.72
Malaysia 79,357 390 9,550 102.618 10.261808 20.523615 35 13.141633 16.733265 37815 3.8005
Turkey 63,888 195084917 25,226 130.536 13.053576 26.107153 61 33.188682 41.151363 29097 #########
Venezuela 11,733 23812 4,520 14.892 1.4891807 2.9783615 68 5.5326429 6.5452858 12828 1,599.00
Currency 
Boards
Argentina 13,586 129 25,937 45.010 2.2505234 4.5010468 79 27.714913 29.492827 13484 2.866
Hong 
Kong, 
China 225,448 3015 57,448 388.145 19.407264 38.814528 22 61.717598 65.987196 112570 7.76771
STED End of Period June 2003 (figures in Millions of Dollars)
Short Term External Debt
Imports Imports of goods, free-on-board (fob) basis - International Financial Statistics
Country Ris Overall risk assessment of the political and macroeconomic environment within the country.
Source: EIU Country Risk Service
M2 Sumof M1 Money Supply (line 34 in IFS) and Quasi Money Supply (line 35 in IFS)
Actual Resenon gold reserves as of end of poeriod July 2003
As per W-K Criterion, South Africa, Hungary, Turkey and Argentina have less than adequate level of reserves 
while most of the countries seem to have much more than the optimal level of reserve.
Fraction of M2 Adequate Reserves
 Opportunity Cost of Holding excess Reserves
Excess Reserves Obtained as diff. between actual reserves and Adequate Reserves
We treat these “excess” levels of reserves as the opportunity cost of maintaining an open capital account.
South Africa, Hungary, Turkey and Argentina are not considered as they 
have less than adequate level of Reserves
Opportunity Cost = (inti - intUSA)*ER(i)
intUSA 1.1



























Brazil 23.8 0.227 1.20955 0.27456766 1,526 535.495 0.051%
Chile 2.9 0.018 3.39155 0.06104791 48,191 76.0891 0.080%
Colombia 7.9 0.068 5.09785 0.34665386 225,676 78.3788 0.442%
India 8.5 0.074 56.3012 4.1662923 26,634 587.947 0.709%
Indonesia 13.3 0.122 11.2773 1.37582566 1,854,668 218.145 0.631%
Korea 5 0.039 71.9807 2.80724763 614,994 522.213 0.538%
Mexico 3.4 0.023 16.5355 0.38031579 6,495 587.416 0.065%
Peru 5 0.039 3.01604 0.11762544 215 61.9079 0.190%
Philippines 5.4 0.043 2.06117 0.08863025 4,109 74.2702 0.119%
Poland 4.9 0.038 14.3422 0.54500514 804 199.212 0.274%
Russian Federation 4 0.029 34.8781 1.01146438 12,803 427.051 0.237%
Thailand 1.4 0.003 19.3831 0.05814938 5,444 136.33 0.043%
Managed Float or Fixed
China 2 0.009 92.2249 0.83002366 11,337 1369.77 0.061%
Czech Republic 2.3 0.012 14.8639 0.17836705 2,304 83.627 0.213%
Malaysia 3.1 0.02 21.0817 0.42163469 378 99.4606 0.424%
Venezuela 23 0.219 6.28271 1.37591441 124,906 78.1151 1.761%
Currency Boards
Hong Kong, China 0.1 -0.01 46.5828 -0.465828 1,250 160.96 -0.289%
int
i Deposit interest rate (%)
The average rate given by banks on certificates of deposit of 30 days or longer. Line 60l in IFS.  
 